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I. INTRODUCTION  
According to its preamble, the stated purpose of the Telecommunications 
Act of 1996 is to “provide for a pro-competitive, de-regulatory national policy 
framework designed to accelerate rapidly private sector deployment of ad-
vanced telecommunications and information technologies and services to all 
Americans….”1 The key statutory tool to facilitate Congress’ deregulatory 
mandate is contained in Section 10 of the 1996 Act2 which, for the first time, 
provided the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) with express le-
gal authority to forbear from enforcing various portions of the Communica-
tions Act once certain conditions are met.3   
While traditionally a backwater issue, the use of the Commission’s forbear-
ance authority has come to the forefront of the modern policy debate.  For ex-
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views expressed in this paper are the authors’ alone and do not represent the views of the 
Phoenix Center or its staff.  We are indebted to Professor Randy Beard, Phoenix Center 
Senior Fellow, for his assistance in formulating the economic models presented in this pa-
per. 
 
 1 H.R. REP. NO. 104-458, at 1 (1996) (Conf. Rep.) (emphasis added). 
 2 See Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 160 (2012). 
 3 Indeed, the anticipated aggressive use of Section 10 over traditional regulation was 
one of the prime justifications for the D.C. Circuit’s recent finding that the FCC may use 
Section 706 as a separate source of ancillary authority. See Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 
639 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“In fact, section 706(a)’s legislative history suggests that Congress 
may have, somewhat presciently, viewed that provision as an affirmative grant of authority 
to the Commission whose existence would become necessary if other contemplated grants 
of statutory authority were for some reason unavailable.”). 
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ample, with the Internet Protocol Transition4 underway, using Section 10 to 
dismantle what is left of the 1996 Act’s unbundling requirements—a paradigm 
essentially rendered moot by a series of court decisions and, ultimately, its own 
2004 Triennial Review Remand Order5—has proven to be a contentious issue 
at the Commission.   
To wit, in December 2005, the agency forbore from many of the remaining 
unbundling requirements, including unbundled loops, in parts of the Omaha 
Metropolitan Statistical Area (“MSA”). The Commission hinged its decision 
largely on the presence of a facilities-based competitor (i.e., a cable company), 
which covered much of the Omaha market, determining that this level of facili-
ties-based competition was sufficient to protect end-users as effectively as reg-
ulation does in the absence of such competition.6 Yet, four years later, the 
                                                     
 4 See generally In the Matter of Technology Transitions, Order, Report and Order and 
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Report and Order, Order and Further Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking, Proposal for Ongoing Data Initiative, FCC 14-05 paras. 5-6, 8, (Jan. 
31, 2014) (discussing experiments in IP transition). 
 5 See In the Matter of Review of the Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent 
Local Exchange Carriers, CC Docket No. 01-338, Report and Order and Order on Remand 
and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 18 FCC Rcd 16978, 16984 (Feb. 20, 2003) 
Direction from the courts, our own experience, and the experience of the telecommuni-
cations industry over the last seven years have caused us to reevaluate the Commis-
sion’s approach to these obligations in light of the Act’s goals of opening local ex-
change markets to competition, fostering the deployment of advanced services, and re-
ducing regulation. Although we recognize that Congress intended to create a competi-
tive landscape through resale, interconnection and facilities-based provision, and a 
combination of these modes of entry, in practice, we have come to recognize more 
clearly the difficulties and limitations inherent in competition based on the shared use 
of infrastructure through network unbundling. 
[hereinafter Triennial Review Remand Order]. Id. 
 6 See In the Matter of Petition of Qwest Corporation for Forbearance Pursuant to 47 
U.S.C. § 160(c) in the Omaha Metropolitan Statistical Area, Memorandum Opinion and 
Order WC Docket No. 04-223, 20 FCC Rcd 19415 paras. 61, 72, 78, (Sept. 16, 2005), aff’d 
Qwest v. FCC, 482 F.3d 471 (D.C. Cir. 2007) [hereinafter Omaha Forbearance Order]. The 
agency did not consider non-cable VoIP providers or competition from mobile wireless. Id. 
para. 72 
Because Qwest has not submitted sufficient data concerning the full substitutability of 
interconnected VoIP and wireless services in its service territory in the Omaha MSA, 
and because the data submitted do not allow us to further refine our wire center analy-
sis, we do not rely here on intermodal competition from wireless and interconnected 
VoIP services to rationalize forbearance from unbundling obligations. 
Id. In terms of line counts, unbundling was not far from its peak at the time, though the Tri-
ennial Review Remand Order had already begun to take its toll (unbundled loop counts fell 
by one-third between June 2005 and June 2006). See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, LOCAL TEL-
EPHONE COMPETITION: STATUS AS OF JUNE 30, 2006 (2007), available at 
http://bit.ly/1GRS86d (multiple years, Table 4). 
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agency would forcibly reject the same request by Qwest within the Phoenix 
MSA, batterfanging its earlier decision in the Omaha Forbearance Order.7 In 
the Phoenix Forbearance Order, the Commission used an antitrust-type “mar-
ket power” methodology, which arguably established an impossible threshold 
for forbearance of unbundled network elements, rendering moot Section 10 as 
a deregulatory tool.8 As a direct result, pending forbearance petitions on un-
bundling mandates were subsequently withdrawn and none have been filed 
since then.9  
In this paper, we use the Phoenix Forbearance Order as a template for out-
lining how the Commission can improve its forbearance analysis for the un-
bundling provisions in the 1996 Act so that its approach is more consistent 
with the economic realities of communications markets and the statute. Our 
proposals are not a panacea for forbearance policy—there is no one-size-fits-all 
approach to the varied aspects of forbearance.  Nevertheless, improved legal 
and economic analysis can be used to refocus the Commission’s efforts. We 
also stress that our analysis is not intended to encourage either approval or de-
nial of forbearance petitions—each is unique—but rather to aid in the assess-
ment of the individual cases in a rational, logical manner. 
We also consider how the Phoenix Forbearance Order impacts the use of 
Section 10 to write a set of legally-sustainable Open Internet rules. While the 
Commission has proposed to move forward using its authority under Section 
706,10 there are increasing calls for the Commission to reclassify broadband 
                                                     
 7 In the Matter of Petition of Qwest Corporation for Forbearance Pursuant to 47 
U.S.C. § 160(c) in the Phoenix, Arizona Metropolitan Statistical Area, Memorandum and 
Order WC Docket No. 09-135, 25 FCC Rcd 8622 paras. 2, 21, 24, 109, (June 15, 2010), 
aff’d, Qwest v. FCC, 689 F.3d 1214 (10th Cir. 2012) [hereinafter Phoenix Forbearance 
Order]. At the time of the request, the nationwide count of unbundled loops was now less 
than half the 2005 level and falling fast. See STATUS AS OF JUNE 30, 2006, supra note 6 (mul-
tiple years, Table 4). 
 8 George S. Ford & Lawrence J. Spiwak, The Impossible Dream: Forbearance After 
the Phoenix Order, PERSPECTIVES: PHOENIX CENTER FOR ADVANCED LEGAL & ECON. PUB. 
POL’Y STUD 1 (Dec. 16, 2010), http://bit.ly/1DQ2c3n. 
 9 The impossible-to-satisfy standard has not been lost on those acquiring inputs from 
the Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers (ILECs). There have been requests for the Commis-
sion to apply its new “market power” approach to its past deregulatory decisions. See, e.g., 
In the Matter of Special Access for Price Cap Local Exchange Carriers; AT&T Corporation 
Petition for Rulemaking to Reform Regulation of Incumbent Local Exchange Carrier Rates 
for Interstate Special Access Services, Report and Order WC Docket 05-25, 27 FCC Rcd 
10557, at 133 (Aug. 22, 2012) (describing the substantial resources the Commission devoted 
to withdrawn forbearance petitions). 
 10 In the Matter of Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, Notice Of Proposed 
Rulemaking, GN Docket No. 14-28, 29 FCC Rcd 5561 paras. 143-47, (May 15, 2014) [here-
inafter 2014 Open Internet NPRM]. 
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Internet access as a common carrier telecommunications service but to use ag-
gressively its authority under Section 10 to create some form of “Title II Lite.” 
As we will show below, however, this approach is legally suspect. Given the 
Commission’s findings that (a) the relevant market for purposes of the Open 
Internet is the “termination” side of the market; and that (b) Broadband Service 
Providers are “monopolists” (i.e., “dominant”) in this termination market, for-
bearance cannot be used to create what is colloquially referred to as “Title II 
Lite.” In fact, if retail broadband Internet access (rather than the termination 
service) is classified as a Title II service, then the Commission’s stance on 
broadband competition combined with its findings in the Phoenix Forbearance 
Order likely require, for the first time, the price regulation of all retail broad-
band connections. 
II. STATUTORY BACKGROUND:  SECTION 10 
It is a well-established principle of administrative law that an agency may 
modify or eliminate its regulations.11 What an administrative agency generally 
may not do, however, is forbear from relevant portions from its statutory man-
date.12 Such was the case of the FCC, which prior to the passage of the Tele-
communications Act of 1996, lacked any authority to forbear from the assorted 
statutory mandates contained in the Communications Act of 1934.13 As a re-
sult, the agency was often forced to engage in legal gymnastics to avoid statu-
tory mandates that had all-too-obviously outlived their usefulness, sometimes 
failing in these efforts.14 Recognizing this problem, and consistent with the de-
regulatory philosophy articulated in the 1996 Act’s preamble, Congress in-
                                                     
 11 See, e.g., Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C §154(i) (2012) (“The Commis-
sion may perform any and all acts, make such rules and regulations, and issue such orders, 
not inconsistent with this chapter, as may be necessary in the execution of its functions.”). 
 12 Id. 
 13 See discussion in MCI World Comm. Inc., et al., v. FCC, 209 F.3d 760, 762 (D.C. 
Cir. 2000). 
 14 For example, this inability to forbear was one of the primary motivations behind the 
Commission’s dominant/non-dominant paradigm for long distance services: i.e., dominant 
firms’ tariffs were generally subject to 45 days notice and comment but, lacking the ability 
to forbear, in order to minimize regulatory burdens on new entrants, the Commission pre-
sumed that non-dominant firms’ tariffs were just and reasonable after only one day notice. 
See MCI v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218, 242 (1994) (“The FCC has in effect adopted a general 
rule stating that ‘if you are dominant you must file, but if you are nondominant you need 
not.’”). When the FCC tried to eliminate tariff requirements for non-dominant long-distance 
carriers altogether, the Supreme Court held that the agency lacked this authority. See id. at 
220, 222. 
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cluded Section 10 in the 1996 Act, entitled “Competition in Provision of Tele-
communications Service.”15 The Section 10 provision permits the Commission 
to forbear not only from its own regulations (which it could always do) but 
also from select portions of the Communications Act if certain conditions are 
met.16 Congress’ bias toward deregulation is apparent in the substantial, almost 
legislative, power embodied within Section 10.17 
A. Requirements for Forbearance 
Section 10(a) states that “the Commission shall forbear from applying any 
regulation or any provision of [the Communications Act]”18 if the Commission 
determines that: 
                                                     
 15 § 160. 
 16 There are limits to the Commission’s authority under this section. Specifically, under 
Section 10(d), the “Commission may not forbear from applying the requirements of section 
251(c) or section 271 under subsection (a) of this section until it determines that those re-
quirements have been fully implemented.” Id. § 160(d). Section 251(c) addresses the inter-
connection and unbundling obligations of Local Exchange Carriers. See In the Matter of 
Petition for Forbearance of the Verizon Telephone Companies Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 
160(c), Memorandum Opinion and Order, WC Docket No. 01-338, 21 FCC Rcd 21496, 
para. 24 (Oct. 22, 2004). Section 271 deals with the Local Exchange Carrier entry into the 
interstate long-distance markets. See id. para. 4 (“Section 271 establishes both the proce-
dures by which a BOC may apply interLATA services in its in-region states and the sub-
stantive standards by which that application must be judged.”). This limitation is no longer 
binding as the Commission has determined that Section 271 and 251(c) are already fully 
implemented for purposes of Section 10(d). See In the Matter of Petition for Forbearance of 
the Verizon Telephone Companies Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 160(c), Memorandum Opinion 
and Order, WC Docket No. 01-338, 21 FCC Rcd 21496, para. 11 (Oct. 22, 2004) (“Except 
as provided in section 251(f), the Commission may not forbear from applying the require-
ments of section 251(c) or 271…until it determines that those requirements have been fully 
implemented”) (hereinafter Section 271 Broadband Forbearance Order); see also Omaha 
Forbearance Order, 20 FCC Rcd 19415, para. 103. 
 17 See § 160. 
 18 Id. § 160(a). Section 332(c)(1)(A) is a forbearance section for mobile wireless carri-
ers that was enacted prior to the passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Id. § 
332(c)(1)(A). The terms of 332(c)(1)(A) closely mirror those of Section 10, with Sections 
10(a)(1), (2), and (3) exactly coinciding. Id. §§ 160(a), 332(c)(1)(A). Section 332(c)(1)(A) 
precludes the Commission from forbearing from Sections 201, 202, and 208 of the statute, 
where no such restriction is included in Section 10. Id. § 332(c)(1)(A). For the most part, 
this difference is immaterial. Section 10(a)(1) mirrors the requirements of Section 201 (just 
and reasonable rates) and 202 (no unduly discriminatory rates), so forbearance from 201 and 
202 is practically precluded by Section 10. See Larry Spiwak, The Problems with Henry 
Waxman’s “Hybrid” Legal Theory, @LAWANDECONOMICS BLOG (Oct. 9, 2014), 
http://bit.ly/1C2guIb (“In other words, the same precedent on Section 201 and 202 attaches 
to Section 10.”); Lawrence J. Spiwak, Section 10 forbearance offers no easy path to “Title 
II Lite,” THE HILL (Oct. 21, 2014), http://bit.ly/1t4fClM. 
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(1) enforcement of such regulation or provision is not necessary to ensure that the 
charges, practices, classifications, or regulations by, for, or in connection with that 
telecommunications carrier or telecommunications service are just and reasonable and 
are not unjustly or unreasonably discriminatory; 
(2) enforcement of such regulation or provision is not necessary for the protection of 
consumers; and 
(3)  forbearance from applying such provision or regulation is consistent with the 
public interest.19  
In making its “public interest” determination under Section 10(a)(3), Section 
10(b) requires the Commission to: 
[C]onsider whether forbearance from enforcing the provision or regulation will pro-
mote competitive market conditions, including the extent to which such forbearance 
will enhance competition among providers of telecommunications services. If the 
Commission determines that such forbearance will promote competition among pro-
viders of telecommunications services, that determination may be the basis for a 
Commission finding that forbearance is in the public interest.20 
The interplay between 10(a)(3) and 10(b) could be significant in some in-
stances, though it has not proven to be so thus far.21 In Section 10(b), Congress 
expresses a concern that regulation can be an impediment to competition, re-
quiring the Commission to consider “whether forbearance…will promote 
competitive market conditions [and] will enhance competition among provid-
ers of telecommunications services.”22 Since competition is the bedrock of for-
bearance, Section 10(b) is a substantive wrinkle in the agency’s forbearance 
activities. 
Finally, Section 10 contains one other relatively unique, yet important pro-
vision:  a one-year “shot clock” for Commission action.23 That is to say, under 
Section 10(c), if the Commission receives a petition for forbearance, then it 
must act on such petition within one year otherwise the petition is “deemed 
                                                     
 19 § 160(a). Commission rules (but not the statute) place the burden of proof, both in the 
production and burden of persuasion, on the petitioner. See In the Matter of Petition to Es-
tablish Procedural Requirements to Govern Proceedings for Forbearance Under Section 10 
of the Communications Act of 1934, as Amended, Report and Order, WC Docket No. 07-
267, 24 FCC Rcd 9543, para. 21 (Jun. 26, 2009) (“the petitioner’s evidence and analysis 
must withstand the evidence and analysis propounded by those opposing the petition for 
forbearance.”) (declaring the Commission’s rules, rather than a statute, places the burden of 
proof on the petitioner for both the production as well as the burden of persuasion). 
 20 § 160(b). 
 21 For the most part, the Commission’s forbearance orders have paid lip service to Sec-
tion 10(b). See Phoenix Forbearance Order, 25 FCC Rcd 8622 paras. 2, 21, 24, 109; see 
also Omaha Forbearance Order, 20 FCC Rcd 19415 paras. 61, 72, 78. 
 22 § 160(b). 
 23 Id. § 160(c). 
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granted.”24 This “deemed granted” condition suggests a strong bias to the grant 
of forbearance, since a grant is provided as the default. 
B. Using Section 10 Forbearance 
Over the years, the Commission has acted on a variety of forbearance peti-
tions.25  Many of its determinations were relatively uncontroversial, given that 
the regulations at issue were not of a significant nature (e.g., reporting re-
quirements, accounting rules, and so forth).26 That said, the Commission has, 
on occasion, attempted to be somewhat bold in the use of its forbearance au-
thority.27 Nevertheless, given the radical changes in the telecommunications 
industry since 1996, many parties feel the Commission has squandered the 
                                                     
 24 See id. 
PETITION FOR FORBEARANCE – Any telecommunications carrier, or class of tele-
communications carriers, may submit a petition to the Commission requesting that the 
Commission exercise the authority granted under this section with respect to that carri-
er or those carriers, or any service offered by that carrier or carriers. Any such petition 
shall be deemed granted if the Commission does not deny the petition for failure to 
meet the requirements for forbearance under subsection (a) within one year after the 
Commission receives it, unless the one-year period is extended by the Commission. 
Id. Referencing Section 10(c) permits the Commission to “extend the initial one-year period 
by an additional 90 days if the Commission finds that an extension is necessary to meet the 
requirements of subsection (a).” Id. 
 25 See generally Informal Timeline for Section 10(b) Forbearance Petitions, FCC, 
http://bit.ly/1GvJoV9 (last updated Feb. 10, 2011) (explaining the Commission’s timeline 
for reviewing forbearance petitions). 
 26 See, e.g., In the Matter of Petition of USTelecom for Forbearance Under 47 U.S.C. § 
160(c) from Enforcement of Certain Legacy Telecommunications Regulations, Memoran-
dum Opinion and Order and Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
and Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, WC Docket No. 12-61, 28 FCC Rcd 
7627 para. 2-4 (May 10, 2013), aff’d Verizon and AT&T v. FCC, 770 F.3d 961 (D.C. Cir. 
2014) [hereinafter USTelecom Forbearance Order] (“[W]e grant forbearance from 126 of 
the approximately 141 rules and requirements covered by USTelecom’s petition…[t]he 
Commission is committed to removing unnecessary requirements.”). 
 27 See, e.g., In the Matter of Policy and Rules Concerning the Interstate, Interexchange 
Marketplace, Implementation of Section 254(g) of the Communications Act of 1934, as 
amended, Second Report and Order, CC Docket No. 96-61, 11 FCC Rcd 20730, para. 22 
(Oct. 31, 1996) [hereinafter Implementation of Section 254(g)] (remarking the forbearance 
from Section 203 tariffing requirements for long-distance carriers); In the Matter of Petition 
of the Embarq Local Operating Companies for Forbearance Under 47 U.S.C. § 160(c) from 
Application of Computer Inquiry and Certain Title II Common-Carriage Requirements, 
Memorandum Opinion and Order, WC Docket No. 06-147, 22 FCC Rcd 19478, para. 46 
(Oct. 24, 2007) (forbearing from legacy “dominant carrier” regulation for ILEC IP-based 
broadband services). 
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opportunity provided by Section 10.28  Regulators regulate and the Commission 
is a regulator. Unsurprisingly, forbearance can be difficult for the agency, es-
pecially when its regulations have created powerful constituencies which bene-
fit from, and are heavily dependent upon, its rules. No doubt, setting aside its 
unbundling (and other wholesale service) obligations, whether in whole or in 
part, is consequential, impacting business plans dependent on the regulatory 
scheme.29  The conditions for forbearance do not include protection of specific 
business plans or particular competitors or types of competitors; forbearance 
aims to reduce regulations that no longer protect end-users or provide measur-
able benefits to society.30 
Given that Section 10 gives the FCC unique power to refuse to enforce por-
tions of its charter statute,31 the mere concept of forbearance deserves a bit of 
contemplation.  Plainly, the 1996 Act seeks to promote competition and reduce 
regulation, substituting the former for the latter.  Yet, the Commission has 
great authority to regulate telecommunications carriers and telecommunica-
tions services. If the competitive outcome is the goal, then why not have the 
Commission just regulate towards the competitive solution? The implied an-
swer is that “it cannot.”   
Also, Section 10(a) permits deregulation only if rates, terms and conditions 
are just and reasonable and not unduly discriminatory, and these are the same 
standards to which the Commission’s own regulations must comply (i.e., § 201 
and § 202 of the Act).32 The statutory expectations of regulation and competi-
tion are nearly identical, but Congress still expressed a strong bias in favor of 
                                                     
 28 See In re Connect Fund, A National Broadband Plan for Our Future, Establishing Just 
and Reasonable Rates for Local Exchange Carriers, High-Cost Universal Service Support, 
Developing an Unified Intercarrier Compensation Regime, Federal-State Joint Board on 
Universal Service, Lifeline and Link-Up, Comments of MetroPCS Communications, Inc., 
WC Docket No. 03-109, at 4 (Apr. 8, 2011) (“Simply put, a lot has changed since 
1996…now is the time for the Commission to reflect these marketplace realities in a truly 
unified intercarrier compensation regime that does not differentiate between increasingly 
converged and substitutable traffic.”). 
 29 See Omaha Forbearance Order, 20 FCC Rcd 19415, paras. 34, 66-67, 88 (noting 
McLeodUSA has removed most of its employees from the Omaha marketplace, has limited 
its operations primarily to serving its existing customer base, and has ceased sales of resi-
dential and nearly all business services in Omaha). 
 30 See 47 U.S.C. § 160(a)-(b); In re Numbering Resource Optimization Petition for For-
bearance from Further Increases in the Numbering Utilization Threshold Under 47 U.S.C. § 
160(c), Cellular Telecommunications & Internet Association Petition for Forbearance from 
Further Increases in the Numbering Utilization Threshold, CC Docket No. 99-200, at 3 
(June 28, 2002) (available via FCC Electronic Comment Filing System). 
 31 See §160(a). 
 32 Id. §§ 160, 201-202. 
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promoting competition and reducing regulation.33 Its preference for competi-
tion is not surprising—regulation is crude and “far from an exact science,”34 
often flavored with raw politics.35  Moreover, most parties would concede that 
markets, competitive or not, are far too complex for effective central planning, 
even by an alleged expert agency.  The 1996 Act’s bias for deregulation seems 
to reflect these realities and suggests that in a forbearance proceeding the effi-
cacy of regulation should be given low marks.  A little bit of competition may 
be better than a whole lot of regulation.  Indeed, by way of analogy, it is inter-
esting to note that in the 1992 Cable Act, Congress explicitly codified the 
tradeoff between the two,36 eliminating rate regulation of franchise markets 
when the market had half a competitor (i.e. a trigger Hirschman-Herfindahl 
Index of 7,450).37  Thus, in the 1992 Cable Act, Congress expressed low confi-
dence in the efficacy of regulation and high confidence in the efficacy of com-
petition. 
III. ASKING THE RIGHT QUESTIONS 
At the most fundamental level, the decision to forbear under Section 10 in-
volves a single, simple question:  is society made worse off if a regulation is 
eliminated?  We use “society” rather than “consumers” because Section 
                                                     
 33 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as amend-
ed in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). 
 34 See, e.g., Fed. Power Comm’n. v. Conway Corp., 426 U.S. 271, 278 (1976) (stating 
that ratemaking is not an exact science in that “there is no single cost-recovering rate”); 
WorldCom v. FCC, 238 F.3d 449, 457 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 168 F.3d 
1344, 1352 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 56 F.3d 151, 163 (D.C. Cir. 
1995); United States v. FCC, 707 F.2d 610, 618 (D.C. Cir. 1983); see also In the Matter of 
Access Charge Reform; Price Cap Performance Review for Local Exchange Carriers; 
Interexchange Carrier Purchases of Switched Access Services Offered by Competitive Local 
Exchange Carriers; Petition of U S West Communications, Inc. for Forbearance from Regu-
lation as a Dominant Carrier in the Phoenix, Arizona MSA, Fifth Report and Order and 
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, CC Docket No. 96-262, 14 FCC Rcd 14221, paras. 
96, 144 (Aug. 5, 1999) (“[R]egulation is not an exact science.”); George S. Ford & Law-
rence J. Spiwak, The Need for Better Analysis of High Capacity Services, 28 J. MARSHALL J. 
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 343, 378-379 (2011). 
 35 See generally George S. Ford & Lawrence J. Spiwak, The Unpredictable FCC: Polit-
icizing Communications Policy and its Threat to Broadband Investment, PERSPECTIVES: 
PHOENIX CENTER FOR ADVANCED LEGAL & ECON. PUB. POL’Y STUD. 1-2 (Oct. 14, 2014), 
http://bit.ly/13DPN2K. 
 36 See Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. 
102-385, 106 Stat. 1460, 1464-1466 (1992) (codified in 47 U.S.C. § 543(a)-(b)). 
 37 See generally id. (we assume a franchise market penetration rate of 70%). 
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10(a)(1) addresses the concept of “just and reasonable,”38 and both the buyer 
and the seller are implicated under that rate-setting standard.39 As for the 
“worse off” element of the question, society need not be made better off from 
forbearance, since an ineffective rule serves no purpose, though its presence 
may serve to reduce competition if there are compliance costs or regulatory 
risks associated with it (implicating Section 10(b)). 
We can formalize a bit by restating the question as whether economic wel-
fare without the regulation, WU, is greater than or equal to economic welfare 
with the regulation, WR, but this formality serves only to draw attention to the 
fact that welfare functions can be very complicated.  Regulation may influence 
costs, demand, quality, the presence and intensity of competition, and just 
about any other market factor of which one may think.40  In some cases, regula-
tion just plain stinks; the Commission has conceded that some of its own rules 
and mandates facilitate collusion,41 are “outdated” and “riddled with inefficien-
cies,” and encourage “wasteful arbitrage.”42  Cable rate regulation mandated by 
the 1992 Cable Act turned out to be ineffective if not disastrous, curbing in-
vestment and reducing quality,43 and this regulation was largely abandoned 
four years after it began.44  As we see it, the complexity in the forbearance 
analysis does not implicate the formulation of the correct question, but is in-
stead restricted to the search for the answer to that question. 
To clarify, consider a simple case where we limit the analysis to price alone, 
assuming that lower prices are preferred by society if not producers, as long as 
                                                     
 38 Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. §160(a)(1) (2012). 
 39 It is well established that a “just and reasonable” rate must fall into what is referred to 
as the “zone of reasonableness”—i.e., it cannot be “confiscatory” on the bottom end (pro-
tecting producers) and “excessive” on the high end (protecting consumers).  Accordingly, 
the phrase “just and reasonable” is not “a mere vessel into which meaning must be poured.” 
Farmers Union Cent. Exch., Inc. v. FERC, 734 F.2d 1486, 1504 (D.C. Cir.), cert denied sub 
nom. Williams Pipe Line Co. v. Farmers Union Cent. Exch., Inc., 469 U.S. 1034 (1984). 
 40 Paul L. Joskow, Regulation and Deregulation After 25 Years: Lessons Learned for 
Research in Industrial Organization, TEX. A&M UNIV. 2, http://bit.ly/1ALvPx0 (last visited 
Nov. 23, 2014). 
 41 Implementation of Section 254(g), 11 FCC Rcd 20730, para. 123-25. 
 42 See, e.g., In the Matter of Connect America Fund, Report and Order and Further No-
tice of Proposed Rulemaking, GN Docket No. 09-51, 26 FCC Rcd 17663, para. 9 (Nov. 18, 
2011), aff’d sub nom. In re FCC 11-161, 753 F.3d 1015 (10th Cir. 2014) (describing FCC 
regulations as “outdated,” “riddled with inefficiencies,” and permitting “opportunities for 
wasteful arbitrage.”). 
 43 See THOMAS W. HAZLETT & MATTHEW L. SPITZER, PUBLIC POLICY TOWARD CABLE 
TELEVISION: THE ECONOMICS OF RATE CONTROLS 102 (1997). 
 44 The Telecommunications Act of 1996 eliminated FCC’s ability to regulate the rates 
for non-basic service tiers for small systems as of 1996 and for all systems as of 1999. Tele-
communications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 543(c)(4) (2012). 
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they are not confiscatory. For example, suppose a given market is 
duopolistically competitive (two firms), with a regulated price, PR, and a duo-
poly price P2. A carrier has petitioned the Commission to forbear from price 
regulation.  Based on the relevant question for forbearance, if P2 ≤ PR, then 
deregulation is warranted—duopolistic competition is at least as good as regu-
lation.  In reality, regulation is rarely this simple; regulation is never merely 
about price, but this fact does not nullify the proper focus of a forbearance pro-
ceeding: Is society made worse off if a regulation is eliminated? 
In assessing whether society is worse off if a regulation is eliminated, it is 
critical the agency assess the efficacy of the regulation in question. In some 
cases, decades-old regulations are non-binding and thus ineffective at produc-
ing any consumer benefit.45 In others, regulations can be actively harmful to 
consumers, raising or shifting costs.46  Regulation is not a “free lunch”; it may 
be very costly. In some cases, the benefits of regulation may be small, espe-
cially as firms adjust their activities to evade regulation or the regulated service 
becomes obsolete.47 In fact, if costs are high and benefits low, forbearance may 
be beneficial to consumers even under monopoly supply conditions. Moreover, 
in some cases market power will be entirely irrelevant to the efficacy of price 
regulation.48 Plainly, a market power standard is too narrow to serve as a gen-
eral framework, and in some cases entirely irrelevant to the question of for-
bearance. 
Deciding whether or not society is worse off if a regulation is eliminated al-
so involves a temporal component. Removing regulations essential to particu-
lar business plans, like unbundling, may very well hurt some providers in the 
short run. Forbearing from price regulation may lead to higher prices for some 
customers, or an increase in discriminatory pricing in the short run.49 If the 
Commission took a very short-run view of the effects of eliminating regula-
tion, then it may be able to conjure up some horror stories. In the longer-run, 
however, the costs of deregulation will diminish as both competition increases 
and consumers adjust to market realities.50 In assessing the consequences of 
                                                     
 45 Thomas W. Hazlett, Economic and Political Consequences of the 1996 Telecommu-
nications Act, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1359, 1363-64 (1999). 
 46 Id. at 1364. 
 47 HAZLETT & SPITZER, supra note 43, at 44. 
 48 T. Randolph Beard, George S. Ford & Lawrence J. Spiwak, Market Definition and 
the Economic Effects of Special Access Price Regulation, 22 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 237, 
244 (2014). 
 49 See Phoenix Forbearance Order, 25 FCC Rcd 8622 para. 2 (finding that regulation is 
necessary to prevent raised prices, unreasonable discrimination, and harm to consumers). 
 50 See NICHOLAS ECONOMIDES, TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATION: AN INTRODUCTION, 
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any forbearance action, therefore, both petitioners and the Commission should 
explicitly state the time period being used in assessing the consequences of 
forbearance. 
IV. FORBEARANCE AND UNBUNDLING  
Without question, forbearance from the unbundling obligations of the 1996 
Act poses a great challenge to the Commission.  Much has been invested in the 
regulatory scheme by the agency, state regulators, and telecommunications 
companies.51  Nevertheless, the Commission has over the years chiseled away 
at the unbundling regime, dealing a significant blow in its 1999 Unbundled 
Network Elements (UNE)-Remand Order and then knocking it to the mat with 
its 2004 Triennial Review Remand Order.52  The evidence bears this out.  In 
2004, there were 19.6 million unbundled loops in operation;53 today, that num-
ber stands at a paltry 6.3 million or about five percent of end-user access lines 
and still falling (see Table 1 below).54 Almost all of these unbundled loops are 
used to serve business rather than residential customers (a distinction that is 
likely relevant for market definition and analysis purposes).55   
                                                                                                                          
IN THE LIMITS AND COMPLEXITY OF ORGANIZATIONS 48-9 (2005), available at 
http://bit.ly/1zBbDjf (“As a result of technological change, cost conditions shift considera-
bly over time and can transform a market that requires regulation into one that does not.”). 
 51 Telecommunications Act of 1996, NAT’L TELECOMM. AND INFO. ADMIN. (Feb. 4, 
1999), http://1.usa.gov/1sE16h6. 
 52 For a detailed examination of the rise and ultimate demise of the U.S. unbundling 
paradigm, see generally George S. Ford & Lawrence J. Spiwak, Lessons Learned from the 
U.S. Unbundling Experience, PHOENIX CENTER FOR ADVANCED LEGAL & ECON. PUB. POL’Y 
STUD. 2-5 (June 2013), http://bit.ly/1zBcCQp (discussing the history of the unbundling re-
gime since the passing of the Telecommunications Act of 1996). 
 53 Coleman Bazelon & Gregory Duncan, Status of the UNE-L in the United States, THE 
BRATTLE GROUP, at1 (Apr. 12, 2012), available at http://bit.ly/1wQ0itw. 
 54 See generally FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N WIRELINE COMPETITION BUREAU, LOCAL 
TELEPHONE COMPETITION: STATUS AS OF JUNE 30, 2013, 10, 15-17 (2014); FED. COMMC’NS 
COMM’N WIRELINE COMPETITION BUREAU, LOCAL TELEPHONE COMPETITION: STATUS AS OF 
DECEMBER 31, 2011, 10, 15-17 (2013); FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N WIRELINE COMPETITION 
BUREAU, LOCAL TELEPHONE COMPETITION: STATUS AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2009, 11, 15-17 
(2011). 
 55 T. Randolph Beard & George S. Ford, Make or Buy? Unbundled Elements as Substi-
tutes for Competitive Facilities in the Local Exchange Network, PHOENIX CENTER FOR AD-
VANCED LEGAL & ECON. PUB. POL’Y STUD. 5 (Sept. 2002), http://bit.ly/1C6vlTy. 
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In 2005, the agency issued its first decision forbearing from portions of its 
unbundling rules.56 The Omaha Forbearance Order found that the facilities-
based competition in the Omaha MSA was sufficient to protect consumers 
even in the absence of the unbundling mandates.57 The agency’s internal con-
flict on unbundling came to a head in the Phoenix Forbearance Order, in 
which the FCC rejected Qwest’s petition for forbearance on unbundling.58 The 
Phoenix Forbearance Order was a landmark decision that not only viciously 
criticized the Omaha Forbearance Order but also proposed to establish a 
“market power” based framework for assessing forbearance petitions involving 
the elimination of regulations that coerce carrier-to-carrier (i.e., wholesale) 
transactions.59 Since the unbundling regime represents the bulk of the 1996 
Act’s regulatory addendum to the Commission’s mission60—a regulatory ex-
pansion at odds with the 1996 Act’s deregulatory bias—we focus our attention 
on the Phoenix Forbearance Order.  Given that the Commission’s Phoenix 
Forbearance Order was highly critical of and in opposition to the arguments 
used in the Omaha Forbearance Order to forbear from certain unbundling re-
quirements,61 we briefly review the earlier order to provide context. 
A. Omaha Forbearance Order 
In 2004, Qwest Corporation filed a forbearance petition requesting relief 
from a number of regulatory requirements, including price-cap regulation and 
some unbundling obligations, in its service territories located in the Omaha 
                                                     
 56 See generally Omaha Forbearance Order, 20 FCC Rcd 19415 para. 1 (“Through this 
Order, we show that we are ready and willing to step aside as regulators and let market forc-
es prevail where facilities-based competition is robust.”). 
 57 Id. 
 58 Phoenix Forbearance Order, 25 FCC Rcd 8622 para. 2. 
 59 USTelecom Forbearance Order, 28 FCC Rcd 7627, para. 26. Pointing to the Phoenix 
Forbearance Order, the Commission stated: 
The Commission has required carriers seeking forbearance from wholesale obligations 
in other contexts, such as loop unbundling, to demonstrate that there is sufficient com-
petition to ensure that, if we provide the requested relief, the carriers will be unable to 
raise prices, discriminate unreasonably, or harm consumers. 
Id. 
 60 See Ford & Spiwak, supra note 52, at 3 (“At the center piece of the 1996 Act was the 
most ambitious regulatory intervention ever attempted…to make unbundled network ele-
ments available to competitors at regulate rates.”). 
 61 Compare Omaha Forbearance Order, 20 FCC Rcd 19415 para. 1; with Phoenix For-
bearance Order, 25 FCC Rcd 8622 para. 2. 
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MSA.62 The Commission granted forbearance for many regulations in its 2005 
Omaha Forbearance Order, but did not grant Qwest’s entire request.63 In the 
Omaha Forbearance Order, the agency followed its general approach to mar-
ket analysis—it defined markets, computed market shares, and so forth—and 
concluded that “the level of facilities-based competition ensures that market 
forces will protect the interests of consumers and regulation is, therefore, un-
necessary.”64 The “facilities-based competition” relied primarily upon in the 
Omaha Forbearance Order was the presence of a cable operator, (i.e., Cox 
Communications) successfully offering and acquiring significant market share 
for telephone services in portions of the Omaha market.65 Where the cable op-
erator was found to have a limited presence, forbearance was not granted.66 
Thus, competition was determined to be a requirement for forbearance from 
the unbundling mandates. In light of the 1996 Act’s deregulatory bias, the 
agency noted that it was “ready and willing to step aside as regulators and let 
market forces prevail where facilities-based competition is robust.”67  
The agency’s decision was based on “examin[ing] the status of competition 
in the retail market as well as the role of the wholesale market in the Omaha 
MSA.”68  For the retail market, the Commission was satisfied that “Cox has 
extensive facilities in the Omaha MSA capable of delivering both mass market 
and enterprise telecommunications services.”69 The Commission ignored the 
role unbundled elements played in the competitive landscape, and noted “that 
competition based on UNE loops and transport make up a minor portion of the 
competition in the Omaha MSA.”70  Thus, the Commission determined that it 
was the facilities-based competition alone in the retail market that warranted 
forbearance, although it recognized that a number of unbundling rules would 
                                                     
 62 Pleading Cycle Established for Comments on Qwest’s Petition for Forbearance in the 
Omaha Metropolitan Area, Public Notice, DA 04-1869, WC Docket No. 04-223 (Jun. 25, 
2004). 
 63 Omaha Forbearance Order, 20 FCC Rcd 19415 paras. 1-2. 
 64 Id. para. 1. 
 65 See id. para. 61 (“We are persuaded by record evidence, some of which Qwest and 
Cox submitted on a wire center basis, that such a level of competition exists in certain of 
Qwest’s wire center service areas located in the Omaha MSA.”). 
 66 See id. paras. 61-62 (“We tailor Qwest’s relief to specific thresholds of facilities-
based competition from Cox.”). 
 67 Id. para. 1. 
 68 Id. para. 65. 
 69 Id. para. 66. 
 70 Id. para. 68. 
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remain in place to permit some continuance of service provision by users of 
unbundled elements.71 
In regards to the public interest condition in Sections 10(a)(3) and 10(b), the 
agency offered a number of reasons why forbearance was consistent with the 
public interest.72 First, the agency concluded that the facilities-based competi-
tion satisfying Section 10(a)(1) and 10(a)(2) implied forbearance was in the 
public interest.73  Second, the agency concluded that granting Qwest relief from 
its loop and transport unbundling obligations in parts of the Omaha MSA will 
help promote competitive market conditions and enhance competition among 
providers of telecommunications services as contemplated by section 10(b).74  
Third, the agency compared the costs and benefits of the unbundling regula-
tions, concluding, “the costs of unbundling obligations in parts of the Omaha 
MSA outweigh the benefits… [],” providing an accurate account of the pur-
pose of the unbundling regime as “a high degree of regulatory intervention 
[that] may initially be required in order to generate competition among direct 
competitors in a situation where one carrier owns the telecommunications net-
work that will be used to provide service to a single pool of customers.”75 The 
agency concluded that 
[w]hile the costs of such regulatory intervention may be warranted in order to foster 
competitive entry into the local exchange and exchange access markets where such 
competition would not otherwise be generated, we find that these costs are unwarrant-
ed and do not serve the public interest once local exchange and exchange access mar-
kets are sufficiently competitive, as is the case in certain limited areas of the Omaha 
MSA.76 
Finally, the Commission determined that “we conclude that our decision to-
day will further the public interest by increasing regulatory parity in the tele-
communications services market in the Omaha MSA.”77  Today, given the sub-
stantial line loss of the Incumbent Local Exchange Carrier (ILEC or Incumbent 
LEC), both to mobile wireless and landline competitors,78 regulatory parity 
should be an important consideration for the Commission. 
                                                     
 71 See id. paras. 68-72 (discussing the unbundling rules that would remain in place). 
 72 See id. paras. 75-77 (discussing the consistency of forbearance with the public inter-
est). 
 73 See id. 
 74 Id. para. 75. 
 75 Id. para. 76. 
 76 Id. para. 77. 
 77 Id. para. 78. 
 78 See generally Patrick Brogan, Consumers Still Shedding Phone Lines Rapidly, US 
TELECOM THE BROADBAND ASS’N (Jun. 28, 2013), http://bit.ly/1Akv93M. 
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B. The Phoenix Forbearance Order 
Following its success in the Omaha market in 2005, Qwest Corporation re-
turned to the Commission two years later with a petition for forbearance in the 
Phoenix MSA.79 This did not go well. In the Phoenix Forbearance Order, the 
Commission decided that “[w]ith the benefit of hindsight and upon further 
consideration, we conclude that there is a better analytical framework than the 
one the Commission employed in the Qwest Omaha Forbearance Order.”80 
The agency did not stop at offering a “better analytical framework,” but would 
batterfang its Omaha Forbearance Order, stating inter alia: (a) “there does not 
appear to be a basis for relying on the predictive judgments the Commission 
made there”; (b) there were “problematic elements of the framework used in 
the Qwest Omaha Forbearance Order”; (c) the Omaha Forbearance Order did 
“not adequately explain why it is appropriate to use fundamentally different 
analytical methodologies to evaluate competition for purposes of unbundling 
relief versus relief from dominant carrier regulation”; and (d) “[t]his higher-
level analysis led to certain conclusions that were not adequately justified as a 
matter of economics.”81 Certainly, the Commission can change its mind and 
has done so many times, but such a barbed attack on its own precedent is rare, 
if not entirely unique. 
In the Phoenix Forbearance Order the Commission announced that it was 
going to adopt a “market power” analysis for the Phoenix MSA forbearance 
review (and those subsequent reviews). As the Commission noted, “we find it 
appropriate to return to a competitive analysis that more carefully defines the 
relevant product and geographic markets and examines whether there are any 
carriers in those markets that, individually or jointly, possess significant mar-
ket power.”82 While the Phoenix Forbearance Order’s market definition analy-
sis was not materially different than its predecessor’s, the market power stand-
ard was a significant change.83 Under the agency’s new standard, forbearance is 
not based on the relative efficacy of regulation and competition, but rather re-
quires “the petitioner [to] demonstrate that it lacks market power,” not only in 
the retail market, but for wholesale services as well.84 In other words, regula-
tion is seen as the “default” position, and forbearance must be “earned” by a 
                                                     
 79 Phoenix Forbearance Order, 25 FCC Rcd 8622, para. 1. 
 80 Id. para. 24. 
 81 Id. paras. 24-26. 
 82 Id. para. 21. 
 83 Id. para. 28; see Publications & Blogs: Tenth Circuit Issues Decision in Qwest Phoe-
nix Forbearance Appeal, KELLEY DRYE (Aug. 7, 2012), http://bit.ly/1xsCa2I. 
 84 Phoenix Forbearance Order, 25 FCC Rcd 8622, paras. 2, 94. 
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strict demonstration emphasizing structural industry characteristics. Market 
power is defined in the Phoenix Forbearance Order as “the power to control 
price,” which “result[ed] in prices above competitive levels.”85 We turn next to 
a discussion on the evaluation of forbearance petitions, using the Phoenix For-
bearance Order as the background for discussing whether a “market power” 
standard applied to a “wholesale market” is appropriate for evaluating Section 
10 forbearance. 
V. WHY THE COMMISSION MUST ABANDON THE PHOENIX 
FORBEARANCE ORDER 
In the previous Sections, we outlined both the relevant statutory texts and 
what we believe to be the important policy questions that need to be asked 
when reviewing a petition for forbearance.  In this section, we briefly outline 
how the Commission failed to undertake these basic tasks when promulgating 
its new “market power” standard in the Phoenix Forbearance Order. 
A. The “Market Power”/”Competitive Levels” Standard Asks the Wrong 
Question 
In the Phoenix Forbearance Order, the Commission requires “the petitioner 
[to] demonstrate that it lacks market power,”86 where market power is defined 
as “the power to control price … resulting in prices above competitive levels.”87  
There are two profound defects in this approach.  First, the Commission’s 
market-power approach does not ask the right question. Second, the definition 
of “competitive levels” is inappropriate.  Let’s tackle the latter first. 
A critical issue in this market-power approach to forbearance is what the 
agency considers to be the “competitive level” of price.88  Ignoring the most 
basic principles of telecommunications economics, the Commission defines the 
“competitive level” of pricing as the pricing outcome of Bertrand Competition 
“under the assumption of perfectly homogeneous products and no capacity 
constraints even in the short run.”89  Bertrand Competition under these assump-
                                                     
 85 Id. paras. 5, 28, 30. 
 86 Id. para. 38, 94 (emphasis supplied). 
 87 Id. para. 5, 28, 30, 82. 
 88 See id. para. 30, 43 (“The forbearance criteria could not be met, however, if Qwest 
could profitably sustain supracompetitive prices.”). 
 89 Id. para. 86; see D. Kreps & J. Scheinkman, Quantity Precommitment and Bertrand 
Competition Yield Cournot Outcome, 14 BELL J. OF ECON. 326, 326-27 (1983). The Bertrand 
Competition means firms compete by cutting price; Cournot Competition, in contrast, has 
(Footnote Continued….) 
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tions has firms cutting price until the price just equals short-run marginal cost 
(of the second lowest cost firm in fact).90  Bertrand Competition, therefore, 
renders the perfectly competitive outcome with only two firms, a result so odd 
that it is sometimes termed the “Bertrand Paradox,”91 because with fixed costs, 
such intense competitive response leads paradoxically to monopoly (or sustains 
one by discouraging entry, even of an equally efficient rival).92  Nevertheless, 
Qwest’s Phoenix petition was denied because the agency “[had] no evidence in 
the record … suggesting that these conditions are present in the markets at is-
sue.”93  Of course, evidence of short-run marginal cost pricing will likely never 
be present in telecommunications markets, making forbearance under the 
Commission’s new “market power” approach impossible. The production of 
telecommunications services requires large (and often sunk) capital expendi-
tures, and these fixed costs render declining average costs (i.e., scale econo-
mies), or what is often called “increasing returns,” a situation recognized by 
the Commission.94 Under such conditions, theory calls for regulation to set 
price equal to average cost, not short-run marginal cost.95  This fact is well es-
tablished in literature of telecommunications regulation, all of which the agen-
cy ignored in the Phoenix Forbearance Order.96 
                                                                                                                          
firms competing by changing quantities. Id. With homogeneous goods, the outcomes of the 
two strategies are very different. Bertrand with a capacity constraint renders the Cournot 
outcomes. Id. 
 90 D. CARLTON & J. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 173 (Pear-
son/Addison Wesley 2005) (“The only possible Bertrand equilibrium … is p = MC.”). The 
focus of the analysis is obviously on short-run pricing.  The long run in economics is a fic-
tion.  Any observed, real-world outcome, such as the present state of competition and regu-
lation, is a short-run phenomenon. Id. It is the actual state of competition, and possibly the 
actual threat of competition, that is relevant for forbearance analysis. Id. 
 91 See, e.g., JEAN TIROLE, MASS. INST. OF TECH., THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANI-
ZATION 209-210 (1988) (introducing the Bertrand Paradox). 
 92 See id. at 211, n. 1 (“Thus if one believes in the existence of at least a small fixed cost 
of production or of entry the market is likely to yield a monopoly.”). 
 93 Phoenix Forbearance Order, 25 FCC Rcd 8622, para. 86.  
 94 See id. para. 11 (“[T]he Commission focused on those operational and economic 
barriers to entry that are linked to natural monopoly characteristics, in particular: ‘(1) econ-
omies of scale (2) sunk costs.’”); id. n.143 (“The record evidence indicates that Qwest’s 
competitors, absent leasing facilities from Qwest, would be unable to provide a timely sup-
ply response and that this response would likely require investment in significant sunk 
costs.”). In many other documents the FCC explicitly acknowledges the supply-side condi-
tions of the telecommunications market. See, e.g., FED. COMMC’N. COMM’N., CONNECTING 
AMERICA: THE NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN 36-7 (2010); Triennial Review Remand Order, 
18 FCC Rcd 16978, para. 84-88. 
 95 Ford & Spiwak, supra note 8, at 3. 
 96 Id. at 1-2. 
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Now, let’s return to the relevant question.  In the Phoenix Forbearance Or-
der, the agency requires “the petitioner [to] demonstrate that it lacks market 
power” to grant forbearance.97  But, the relevant question is not whether there’s 
market power, but whether or not society is no worse off if the regulation is 
eliminated.  Plainly, the Phoenix Forbearance Order asks the wrong question.  
The defect in the Commission’s approach can be demonstrated by going back 
to the simple model of forbearing from price regulation above.  Let’s permit 
the “competitive level” of price to be that associated with a very large number 
of sellers (where price will be close to marginal cost), say ten competitors, la-
beled P10.  According to the Phoenix Forbearance Order, forbearance is not 
permitted unless P2 ≤ P10.
98  Unless the regulated price is equal to P10, this ine-
quality is plainly an inappropriate and irrelevant comparison but is nonetheless 
exactly the one proposed in the Phoenix Forbearance Order.99  By looking to a 
“competitive level,” the Commission has failed to focus on the regulation, 
which is the true target for comparison.  Only if the agency’s regulations have 
produced a price equal to the “competitive levels”—which is implausible100—
will the Phoenix Forbearance Order’s market power approach make sense. 
Similarly, the Phoenix Forbearance Order’s focus on potential collusion 
makes the same error.  In rejecting the forbearance request, the Commission, in 
its Phoenix Forbearance Order, states: “when there are only a few firms in a 
market, they are more likely to engage in coordinated interaction includ[ing] 
tacit as well as explicit collusion, and can result in supracompetitive pricing.”101  
In fact, economic theory does not say firms “are likely” to recognize their mu-
tual interdependence, it assumes they do.102  (“Are likely” is an empirical 
statement, not a theoretical one.)  Nevertheless, the potential for collusion can-
not be dismissed, but even in the presence of collusion, the elimination of regu-
lation may be warranted.  Going back to the simple price comparison above, 
                                                     
 97 Id. at 1. 
 98 Phoenix Forbearance Order, 25 FCC Rcd 8622, n.88. As discussed below, and in 
Impossible Dream, this case is pretty much exactly what the Phoenix Forbearance Order 
proposes, that is, simple Bertrand Competition with homogenous goods. See Infra discus-
sion p. 25; see also The Impossible Dream, supra note 8. 
 99 See Ford & Spiwak, supra note 8, at 2-4 (if the agency can set a price equal to such a 
high level of competition, it is sensible to ask why we need competition). 
 100 See id. at 5. In essentially every case, competitive entry into telecommunications ser-
vices has reduced prices and increased quality, which is why competition is so desirable. Id. 
 101 Phoenix Forbearance Order, 25 FCC Rcd 8622, para. 30; see Qwest v. FCC, 689 
F.3d 1214, 1233-34 (10th Cir. 2012). Given the “well-documented anticompetitive risks of 
duopoly,” coupled with the decline of UNE competition, the agency’s new “market power” 
test was not unreasonable. Id. 
 102 Ford & Spiwak, supra note 8, at 7. 
2014] COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 145 
say that a symmetric duopoly is engaged in some form of collusion rendering a 
price that is equivalent to a market with 1.5 firms, or P1.5.
103  Granting forbear-
ance in such a situation is prescribed when P1.5 ≤ PR.
104  (In light of the general 
poor quality of regulation, it is not difficult to imagine this condition being 
satisfied.)  By juxtaposing P1.5 and P2, the Commission has again asked the 
wrong question.  In deciding a forbearance petition, the agency must consider 
how well regulation works—not theoretically, but practically—and how much 
competition is sufficient to accomplish the same outcomes.  In most cases, 
competition, even in small numbers, produces non-cooperative outcomes with 
price approximating average cost.105  
B. Focus on Retail Markets 
In both the Omaha and Phoenix proceedings, Qwest sought forbearance 
from certain unbundling obligations, appealing primarily to the presence of a 
facilities-based competitor (a cable company) as sufficient to protect consum-
ers in the absence of the competition provided by those offering retail services 
using unbundled elements acquired from Qwest under regulatory mandates.106  
In the Omaha Forbearance Order, the Commission agreed—facilities-based 
competition was deemed sufficient to protect competitors even if forbearance 
eliminated the competition from unbundled elements.107  In contrast, in the 
Phoenix Forbearance Order the Commission defined and evaluated a separate 
“wholesale market” for unbundled elements, and found that “the record reveals 
that no carrier besides Qwest provides meaningful wholesale services through-
out the Phoenix marketplace….”108 While the Omaha Forbearance Order 
found the same,109 only the Phoenix Forbearance Order rejected forbearance 
on such grounds.110 
                                                     
 103 See id. at 5-7. We recognize that such an outcome is infeasible in a homogenous Ber-
trand situation, as is any outcome but the monopoly one. Id. 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. at 6, 9. 
 106 See Omaha Forbearance Order, 20 FCC Rcd 19415, para. 1. Competition provided 
by mobile wireless industry and over-the-top VoIP providers was part of the petition. Id. 
 107 See id. para. 63. In the Omaha Forbearance Order, the agency did not ignore the 
wholesale exchange of services, but it did not elevate the regulatory-mandated unbundling 
obligations to “market” status. Id. 
 108 Phoenix Forbearance Order, 25 FCC Rcd 8622, para. 2. 
 109 Omaha Forbearance Order, 20 FCC Rcd 19415, para. 67 
 110 Phoenix Forbearance Order, 25 FCC Rcd 8622, 8623, para. 2. 
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These two findings conflict, so it’s natural to consider which decision is 
more consistent with the statute.  By its plain language, Section 10(a) permits 
forbearance if and only if rates remain just and reasonable and consumers re-
main “protected” in the absence of regulation.111  The statute appears focused 
on retail markets.112  As such, a strong case can be made that the Omaha For-
bearance Order takes the correct approach, focusing on whether there is suffi-
cient competition (from whatever source) in the retail market to protect con-
sumers.  While the unbundling rules mandate the local exchange company to 
sell portions of its network,113  such transactions do not constitute a “market” in 
any meaningful sense.  As observed by the Supreme Court in Verizon v. 
Trinko, “[t]he unbundled elements offered pursuant to §251(c)(3) exist only 
deep within the bowels of Verizon; they are brought out on compulsion of the 
1996 Act and offered not to consumers but to rivals, and at considerable ex-
pense and effort.”114  
As made clear by the Court, there is no “market” for unbundled elements—
network elements are exchanged under duress and at great expense.115  The 
unbundling mandates created this “wholesale market” out of thin air; this 
“wholesale market” did not and perhaps does not exist outside the minds of 
Congress and the Commission.116  To determine a forbearance request by the 
presence or absence of competition in a fabricated market is improper. 
Given the high-cost of supply and the intensely-regulated nature of this al-
leged “wholesale market,” there is also a strong dose of circularity to the agen-
cy’s logic.  The prices and terms of this alleged “wholesale market,” estab-
lished by regulators and not market forces, could be so unattractive that there is 
no reason for other firms to enter the “wholesale market.”  A lack of entry into 
the “wholesale market” merely implies that no carrier believes there’s any 
                                                     
 111 Id. para. 14. 
 112 Id. paras. 97-100. 
 113 James L. Gattuso, Local Telephone Competition: Unbundling the FCC’s Rules, HER-
ITAGE FOUND. 
(Feb.10, 2013), http://herit.ag/1z97Gn3. 
 114 Verizon v. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 410 (2004). 
 115 Id. 
 116 Verizon Commc’n Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 528 (2002). In the long distance mar-
ket, capacity was sold on a wholesale basis, so we cannot exclude the possibility that there 
could be a wholesale market for capacity.  For most carriers, doing so was voluntarily, how-
ever, and not mandated by rules.  That said, there need not be such a market. See T. Ran-
dolph Beard, George S. Ford & Lawrence J. Spiwak, Why ADCo? Why Now? An Economic 
Exploration into the Future Industry Structure for the “Last Mile” in Local Telecommunica-
tions Markets, 54 FED. COMM. L.J. 421, 454-55 (May 2002) (predicting the emergence of a 
wholesale (only, possibly) carrier based on customer acquisition costs). 
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money in selling unbundled elements, and the Commission’s rules are relevant 
to the potential entrant’s decisions.  In essence, the Commission has created a 
market that is regulated on such terms that no firm wishes to enter it, then, after 
doing so, the agency uses this lack of entry to reject a forbearance request. 
Again, it helps to return to the central question: is society made worse off if 
a regulation is eliminated?  Unbundling is the regulation—it is not the eco-
nomic transaction of interest.  It is not an economic transaction at all—it is 
coerced.  The relevant question for forbearance is if unbundling is eliminated, 
then are consumers facing rates expected to be unjust or unreasonable?  Are 
consumers left unprotected?  Even in the face of facilities-based competition, 
the answer may be “yes,” but this finding is not based on whether there is a 
competitive supply of a highly-regulated, forced transaction—the conclusion is 
supported by an appeal to the retail market.117  The Commission may very well 
determine that competition from unbundled elements adds meaningfully to 
retail market competition, though with facilities-based competition the case 
would be difficult to make.  Therefore, the relevance of these transactions is on 
the retail market, not the “wholesale market.”118  Also, the presence of competi-
tion in the supply of network elements may be relevant, but only because of its 
effect on the retail market.119  Competition in telecommunications can work to 
benefit consumers whether there is a wholesale market or not. 
C. Costs, Benefits and the Shrinking Market for POTS 
In 1996, the incumbent LECs were capable of serving essentially every 
home in the country, and provided service to about 95% of them.120  There was 
no broadband Internet service to speak of, and basic telephone service was a 
stable, viable product.121  Things have changed.  About 40% of households 
have abandoned the wireline telephone market altogether, and cable operators 
                                                     
 117 Harold Ware & Christian M. Dippon, Wholesale Unbundling and Intermodal Compe-
tition, 34 TELECOMM. POL’Y. 54, 54 (Jan. 7, 2010), available at http://bit.ly/1C3Vnth. 
 118 Thomas W. Hazlett, The Irony of Regulated Competition in Telecommunications, 4 
COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 14 (2003). 
 119 Ware & Dippon, supra note 117, at 56. 
 120 See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N WIRELINE COMPETITION BUREAU, TELEPHONE SUB-
SCRIBERSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES (DATA THROUGH JUL. 2013) 12, 6 (2013) (Table 1: 
93.9% of homes had a subscription to telephone service in November 1996). 
 121 See Brian Patrick Eha, An Accelerated History of Internet Speeds (Infographic), EN-
TREPRENEUR (Sept. 25, 2013), http://entm.ag/1wIuckp (“The earliest broadband in North 
America was available in 1996 in Canada” “between 2000-2001, broadband subscriptions 
increased 50%.”); Jube Shiver Jr., Baby Bell Mergers Provoke Debate on 1996 Telecomm 
Act, LOS ANGELES TIMES (May, 18, 1998), http://lat.ms/13E3bUD. 
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and other VoIP providers provide wireline voice service to about one-third of 
customers.122  Today, the incumbent LECs provide service to less than half of 
households.123  The wireline voice market is shrinking, not only for the incum-
bent LECs, but for all wireline carriers.124  Since 2009, incumbent LEC lines 
have fallen from about 180 million to about 107 million in 2013.125  Over the 
same interval, all access lines have fallen from about 190 million to 150 mil-
lion.126  The number of access lines served using unbundled elements has also 
fallen spectacularly over the past 10 years to the point of being inconsequen-
tial.127  Peaking at nearly 20 million access lines served using unbundled ele-
ments in 2004, that number fell to about 6 million lines access lines as of June 
2013.128  (In the final column of Table 1, we see that the ILECs report only 
providing only 2.8 million unbundled loops in June 2013, an amount far below 
CLEC-reported access lines.  This difference is perhaps explained, in part, by 
the provision of multiple lines over a single facility).  Only 5% of access lines 
are served using unbundled elements.129 Moreover, unbundled elements are 
rarely used today to provide residential service, suggesting any analysis of for-
bearance should separate the residential and business customers into distinct 
markets.130  Commission data indicates that only 14% of CLEC access lines 
serve residential customers (using all provision modalities and not just unbun-
dled elements), constituting a market share of total access lines of less than 4% 
                                                     
 122 CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, WIRELESS SUBSTITUTION: EARLY RELEASE OF ESTIMATES 
FROM THE NATIONAL HEALTH INTERVIEW SURVEY, JANUARY–JUNE 2013 1 (2013) 
Two in every five American homes (39.4%) had only wireless telephones (also known 
as cellular telephones, cell phones, or mobile phones) (during the first half of 2013—an 
increase of 1.2 percentage points since the second half of 2012. In addition, nearly one 
of every six American homes (15.7%) received all or almost all calls on wireless tele-
phones despite also having a landline telephone. 
Id. 
 123 STATUS AS OF JUNE 30, 2013, supra note 54, at 4. 
 124 Genevieve Morelli, Response to ACA NCTA, ITTA 2 (Apr. 30, 2012), 
http://bit.ly/1xsDT8j. 
 125 STATUS AS OF JUNE 30, 2013, supra note 54, at 2. 
 126 Id. 
 127 See id. at 12, 14-16; STATUS AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2011, supra note 54, at 12, 14-16; 
STATUS AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2009, supra note 54, at 13, 15-17. 
 128 See STATUS AS OF JUNE 30, 2013, supra note 54, at 12, 14-16; STATUS AS OF 
DECEMBER 31, 2011, supra note 54, at 12, 14-16; STATUS AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2009, supra 
note 54, at 13, 15-17. 
 129 See STATUS AS OF JUNE 30, 2013, supra note 54, at 12, 14-16. Out of approximately 
135.1 million access lines, 6.3 million are using unbundled elements, which equates to about 
5%. Id. 
 130 Id. 
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in the residential sector.131  (We suspect a strong case could be made today for 




Table 1.  Shares of End-User Switched Access Lines 
  End-User Switched Access Lines  Shares   
Year  UNE VoIP 
Other 
Non-ILEC 




2004  19,624 … … 147,993  … … …  23,057 
2005  19,025 … … 143,758  … … …  20,691 
2006  12,547 … … 142,293  … … …  14,579 
2007  11,511 … … 134,640  … … …  12,032 
2008  10,884 … … 124,606  … … …  10,241 
2009  8,631 23,032 12,688 112,748  5% 15% 72%  9,131 
2010  7,701 26,895 14,481 102,395  5% 18% 68%  8,403 
2011  6,950 30,136 15,734 93,394  5% 21% 64%  7,662 
2012  6,654 33,948 15,142 85,848  5% 24% 61%  7,185 
2013  6,320 37,257 13,013 78,537  5% 28% 58%  2,788 
Source:  FCC Local Competition Reports (2009, 2011, 2014), Tables 1, 3, 4, 5.   
            
 
In contrast to competition from unbundled elements, cable company and 
other IP-based carrier provision of telephone service has been a resounding 
success, growing to a level that outpaced unbundling even in the latter’s hey-
day.132  In June 2003, FCC data indicates that 28% of end-user switched access 
lines are serviced by non-ILEC VoIP providers (including cable operators).133  
Table 1 shows that the first year VoIP line data was reported, the VoIP provid-
ers had acquired more lines (23 million) than CLECs ever had using unbundled 
elements (peaking at just under 20 million lines in 2004).134   
In both the Omaha Forbearance Order and the Phoenix Forbearance Order 
the Commission did not consider mobile wireless service as a competitor to 
                                                     
 131 Id. at 12, 20-22. 
 132 Id. at 12, 14-16. 
 133 Id. 
 134 Id.; STATUS AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2011, supra note 54, at 12, 14-16; STATUS AS OF 
DECEMBER 31, 2009, supra note 54, at 13, 15-17. 
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wireline telephone service.135  But mobile wireless substitution has done much 
to shrink the market for wireline service.136  Even if the agency treats the mo-
bile wireless and wireline services as independent in demand, the cord-cutting 
data does have relevance in a forbearance case, especially in relation to main-
taining a regime of unbundled network elements.  The cost of maintaining an 
unbundling operation at an ILEC is likely not small, as the carriers must have 
ordering and billing systems, dedicated personnel, and so forth.137  As a conse-
quence of mobile substitution, these costs are spread across a dwindling num-
ber of incumbent LEC customers (whether directly or using unbundled 
loops).138  Given scale economies, the average cost of the unbundling regime is 
likely to be large, and an updated cost models reflecting line-loss would imply 
that the cost of the element itself has risen significantly, attenuating the already 
marginal effect of unbundling on the retail market.139  The competitive effect of 
unbundling is further attenuated by the fact the price of unbundled elements 
alone is very close to, in many cases, the retail price for telephone service of-
fered by the typical cable operator, leaving little to no margin for the CLEC.140  
So, while many parties attribute the decline in unbundled element competition 
to the Commission’s 2004 Triennial Review Remand Order—which admitted-
ly was a significant blow to the unbundling regime—the fact is that CLECs 
would not have fared well against VoIP competitors at the regulated prices for 
unbundled elements in any case, especially in the residential market.141  As 
wireless substitution and widespread facilities-based competition rise, the po-
tential benefits of unbundling are dwindling yet the average costs of the regime 
per unbundled line are likely rising, strengthening the case for forbearance.   
Perhaps the unbundling issue can be boiled down to a very basic inquiry:  
would there have been a 1996 Act requiring the local phone company to un-
                                                     
 135 Omaha Forbearance Order, 20 FCC Rcd 19415, para. 72; Phoenix Forbearance 
Order, 25 FCC Rcd 8622, para. 89. 
 136 Carol Wilson, Telcos are shrinking, study says, CONNECTED PLANET (Apr. 1, 2009, 
9:42 AM), http://bit.ly/1GvXKoo. 
 137 Omaha Forbearance Order, 20 FCC Rcd 19415, para. 76. 
 138 See Craig A. Anderson, Toward a Fair Network Access Rate Policy for Rural Broad-
band Service Providers, 14 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 39, 93-94 n. 187 (2005) (describing the 
cost effects that cellular services have as a substitute service). 
 139 See Jerry Ellig & James Nicholas Taylor, What Did the Unbundled Network Element 
Platform Cost, 14 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 1, 18 (2005) (describing the application of 
TELRIC). 
 140 See COX COMMC’N, http://bit.ly/1GvXYfn (last visited Sept. 23, 2014) (advertising 
that Cox Cable offers a telephone service for about $23.99). 
 141 See Ellig & Taylor, supra note 139, at 22 (discussing that in order to encourage com-
petition). 
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bundle its network at regulated rates if at the time 40% of households did not 
have a wireline phone; facilities-based competitors served nearly a third of the 
wireline business using digital technologies; Internet services had mostly re-
placed voice communications; and the phone company provided service to less 
than half of households?  We doubt it, yet the Commission refuses to forbear 
from residual unbundling requirements.   
VI. REALISTIC EXPECTATIONS OF MARKET STRUCTURE 
Regulation aims to approximate efficient outcomes, which roughly means to 
imitate competitive outcomes.  It does the job poorly in most cases, but imita-
tion is nevertheless its purpose.  As such, it is critical to have realistic expecta-
tions about the potential for competition and the efficacy of regulation.  By 
failing to establish reasonable expectations of competition in telecommunica-
tions markets, the Commission has done policy making a great disservice, 
since much of the policy debate, across all issues, includes references to com-
petitive outcomes that are irrelevant to communications markets.  In the Phoe-
nix Forbearance Order, the agency falls victim to its own failing in this regard, 
establishing a “competitive level” entirely inconsistent with the economics of 
the industry.142  While in a few instances, including the National Broadband 
Plan, the Commission has embraced a more sensible and modern approach to 
competitive analysis, its advanced analysis in these few instances have not 
transferred reliably to other agency actions.143 
Entry into telecommunications markets, especially facilities-based entry, re-
quires significant fixed and sunk set-up costs, such as building a telecommuni-
cations network and the acquisition of customers through advertising.144 These 
costs drive industry structure.  Like prices, the number of competitors in an 
industry is an equilibrium outcome.  In many game theoretic models of indus-
try structure, the entry process is modelled as a two-stage game, where in the 
first stage firms make entry (i.e., investment) decisions and, in the second 
stage, engage in price competition.145  Firms are neither naïve nor stupid: they 
                                                     
 142 Compare Phoenix Forbearance Order, 25 FCC Rcd 8622, paras. 8, 120; with George 
S. Ford, Thomas M. Koutsky & Lawrence J. Spiwak, Competition After Unbundling: Entry, 
Industry Structure and Convergence, 59 FED. COMM. L.J. 331, 340 (2007). 
 143 See NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN, supra note 94, at 29, 44, 64 n.53 (discussing the 
Commission’s approach to competition analysis). 
 144 Ford et al., supra note 142, at 356. 
 145 JOHN SUTTON, SUNK COSTS AND MARKET STRUCTURE: PRICE COMPETITION, ADVERTIS-
ING, AND THE EVOLUTION OF CONCENTRATION 8 (1991); see also John Sutton, Game Theory 
and Industry Studies an Introduction and Review, in Applied Indus. Econ. 37, 39-41 (Louis 
(Footnote Continued….) 
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enter if and only if they reasonably expect the resulting industry structure to 
justify their sunk investments.146  These models provide important insights for 
forming sound competition and communications policy.  We have detailed 
these types of models in earlier works, including Competition After Unbun-
dling: Entry, Industry Structure and Convergence147 and Changing Industry 
Structure: The Economics of Entry and Price Competition,148 but we sadly can-
not claim to have invented these ideas—they are based on established eco-
nomic models.149 
These game-theoretic models expose the limitations of applying traditional 
competition analysis to the communications industries where entry costs are 
high. The implication is that the equilibrium market structure will always be 
relatively concentrated compared to industries where entry does not require 
substantial set-up costs.150  The relationship between the number of firms and 
market power, where market power is defined as the ability of firms to price 
above short-run marginal cost, implies that some communications firms will 
now, and in the future, possess some degree of market power.151  Thus, refusing 
to forbear in the presence of market power implies the agency will never for-
bear—ever.  Also, these models show that high concentration may be the result 
of intense price competition, rather than being an indicator of a lack of it.152  
The traditional view that more firms mean more competition must be qualified 
by the possibility that more intense price competition means fewer firms. 
We suspect that many parties lament at the fact the telecommunications 
market will often be characterized by few competitors.  Unfortunately, the cur-
rent economic realities of the telecommunications market prescribe such an 
outcome, and little can be done to change it.  However, a material change in 
perspective, from the short-run to the long-run, suggests a useful result.  In the 
long-run, all inputs of production can be changed.153  At the equilibrium indus-
                                                                                                                          
Phlips ed., 1998) (explaining exogenous sunk costs within industries generally chiefly with-
in chapters one and two). 
 146 SUTTON, supra note 145, at 28-29. 
 147 See Ford et al., supra note 142, at 332-33, 336-37. 
 148 Jerry Duvall & George Ford, Changing Industry Structure: The Economics of Entry 
and Price Competition, in PHOENIX CENTER POL’Y PAPER SERIES, 5, 11-12 (2001). 
 149 SUTTON, supra note 145, at 69, 76-77. 
 150 See William Baumol & Dietrich Fischer, Cost-Minimizing Number of Firms and De-
termination of Industry Structure, 92 Q. J. ECON. 439, 439-41 (1978) (providing a thorough 
theoretical analysis of equilibrium market structure via the perspective of “cost-
minimization.”). 
 151 Duvall & Ford, supra note 148, at 12-13, 23. 
 152 Ford et al., supra note 142, at 348-49. 
 153 See, e.g., Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 495-96 (2002) (citing FCC 
(Footnote Continued….) 
2014] COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 153 
try structure, the entry condition indicates that profits are zero, and thus price 
equals long-run incremental cost.154  Consequently, the equilibrium industry 
structure, regardless of how concentrated it is, is broadly consistent with the 
competitive outcome (zero profits, price equals long-run incremental cost).155  
If rates are to be just and reasonable, and thus non-confiscatory, then this equi-
librium is the best the regulator can hope for.  Absent collusion (which is 
largely the responsibility of the antitrust agencies), regulation cannot improve 
upon the competitive equilibrium.  To do so, price would be set below cost, 
perhaps deterring entry in doing so.156 
VII. THE PHOENIX FORBEARANCE ORDER AND “TITLE II LITE” 
As noted above, as the Commission struggles to write a legally-sustainable 
set of Open Internet rules, there are calls for the Commission to reclassify 
broadband Internet access as a Title II common carrier telecommunications 
service.  However, conceding the point that Title II regulation could slow in-
novation, there are a variety of proposals which ask the Commission to use its 
forbearance authority to forbear from many portions of Title II, ending up with 
                                                                                                                          
Forward-looking Economic Cost, 47 CFR 51.505) (explaining that the FCC’s Total Element 
Long Run Incremental Cost (TELRIC) standard is a long-run cost standard, where every-
thing but the locations of the existing wire centers can be changed); see also MCI 
Commc’ns Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1115 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 
464 U.S. 891 (1983) (explaining that Long-Run Incremental Cost (LRIC) standard is also a 
long-run cost concept, but assesses the average cost of adding an entire new service or prod-
uct rather than merely the last unit of production). 
 154 Sutton, supra note 145, at 32, 63. 
 155 Ford et al., supra note 142, at 337-38. 
 156 See LOUIS PHLIPS, COMPETITION POLICY: A GAME-THEORETIC PERSPECTIVE 11-12 
(1995) 
I therefore am ready to argue that the competitive Nash equilibrium provides the equi-
librium concept that…defines the lower limit to which active competition should re-
duce industry prices or the upper limit to which active competition should push indus-
try production.  Once this limit is reached, no oligopolist has an incentive to break 
through it…To reach a competitive Nash equilibrium of a single-shot game is the best 
antitrust policy can hope for in oligopolistic markets (which is a far reaching statement, 
given that most real life markets are oligopolistic. Therefore, if normal competition is 
the objective of antitrust policy, it should be defined as and have the properties of a 
competitive Nash equilibrium.  Let me make this statement a bit more precise and in-
sist that, given the multiplicity of possible Nash equilibria, I mean a ‘perfect’ competi-
tive Nash equilibrium (in quantities or prices, according to the strategies chosen by the 
industry). Such a perfect Nash equilibrium is part of a two-stage equilibrium, in which 
the other stage implies a market structure that is endogenously determined by the given 
technology and given tastes. 
Id. 
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what is colloquially referred to as “Title II Lite.”157   While the Phoenix For-
bearance Order’s “market power” test is most directly relevant to wholesale 
obligations, it is nonetheless important to ask whether the Phoenix Forbear-
ance Order has any application to attempts to use Section 10 to create a “Title 
II Lite.”  After some consideration, we think that it does. 
At the heart of the Commission’s theory for imposing Open Internet rules is 
the agency’s finding that Broadband Service Provider’s (“BSP”) have the abil-
ity and incentive to act in ways that slow the deployment of advanced commu-
nications networks because each is a “terminating monopoly” (i.e., each firm is 
“dominant”).158  In Verizon v. FCC, the D.C. Circuit agreed with this charac-
terization of the BSP and laid out a clear path forward for the Commission to 
address this concern under Section 706 without having to engage in significant 
legal gymnastics159—an approach which the Commission embraced in its 2014 
Open Internet Notice of Proposed Rulemaking.160  If the Commission were to 
adopt the Title II path for net neutrality rather than proceeding under Section 
706, then the Commission must justify forbearance in the presence of a mo-
nopoly in the relevant market (the “termination market”).  Yet, the Phoenix 
Forbearance Order explicitly rejects forbearance in the presence of monopoly 
(and the agency has never forborne from price regulation in the presence of 
monopoly).161  Thus, either forbearance is legitimate under monopoly and the 
Phoenix Forbearance Order’s legal foundation falls (which would not be a bad 
thing) or the “Title II Lite” legal foundation falls.162   
The Commission’s path to Title II Lite does not ease even if we accept ar-
guendo that the relevant market for net neutrality is the retail market (rather 
than the terminating market).163 As noted above, in the Phoenix Forbearance 
                                                     
 157 For a full explanation of the legal validity and implication of these proposals, see 
George S. Ford & Lawrence J. Spiwak, Tariffing Internet Termination: Pricing Implications 
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Order, the Commission deliberately refused to accept wireless as a legitimate 
competitive substitute for wireline access and, as such, found that there were 
only two wireline firms—i.e., a duopoly—in each market.  For purposes of 
Section 10 forbearance, the Commission specifically held that it was inappro-
priate to assume that  
[A] duopoly always constitutes effective competition and is necessarily sufficient to 
ensure just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory rates and practices, and to protect con-
sumers. The potential for supracompetitive prices may be a concern where there is a 
duopoly or a market dominated by a few firms and there are high barriers to entry into 
the market.164 
Accordingly, the Commission found that “the move from monopoly to duo-
poly is not alone necessarily sufficient to justify forbearance…”165 and the 10
th
 
Circuit affirmed the agency’s logic.166  Combining the Commission’s holding 
in the Phoenix Forbearance Order that two firms are insufficient to warrant 
forbearance with a recent FCC analysis which found that “[a]t the current FCC 
benchmark for high-speed Internet service … the majority of Americans have a 
choice of only two providers,”167 the use of Section 10 forbearance to create a 
“Title II Lite” would be a hard sell to a reviewing court.168  Importantly, the 
“duopoly” issue is relevant to the retail and not the terminating market (the 
latter of which the Commission claims is a monopoly).  Classifying broadband 
as a Title II service, therefore, may—under the competitive analysis of the 
                                                     
 164 Phoenix Forbearance Order, 25 FCC Rcd 8622, para. 29. 
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Phoenix Forbearance Order—unavoidably lead to the price regulation of all 
retail broadband services.169 
VIII. CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 aimed to “provide for a pro-
competitive, de-regulatory national policy framework” for the nation’s com-
munications markets.170  While the 1996 Act included a number of regulations 
designed to promote competition, these burdensome schemes, including net-
work unbundling, were intended to be short-lived and eventually set aside by 
the Commission using its Section 10 forbearance authority.  Dismantling the 
meager remnants of the 1996 Act’s unbundling regime has proven difficult for 
the agency.  Faced with the essentially same evidence from the same petitioner 
across two proceedings, the Commission reached two entirely opposite conclu-
sions, forbearing from much of the unbundling mandates in 2005 but refusing 
to grant any relief in 2009.  The agency’s 2009 decision—the Phoenix For-
bearance Order—was a mess, asking the wrong questions and bungling the 
economics of the industry.  Nevertheless, the Phoenix Forbearance Order 
serves as a useful template for outlining how the agency can improve its for-
bearance analysis going forward. 
Perhaps the most important lesson learned from the Phoenix Forbearance 
Order is that when contemplating forbearance from any regulation or mandate, 
the first and most-important step is to ask the right question.  That is: does re-
moving the regulation make society worse off?  It is this question that drives 
the analysis and gives meaning to the empirical evidence.  This simple ques-
tion points to a cost-benefit analysis in which the agency considers the purpose 
of the regulation, provides an honest assessment of the efficacy of it (including 
the compliance costs and unintended consequences of the regulations), and 
then decides how much competition, if any, is sufficient to accomplish the 
same goal.  In its Phoenix Forbearance Order, the Commission failed to ask 
the right question (among many other errors), focusing instead on a compari-
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son of the observed level of competition to some unobtainable competitive 
nirvana and did so for a phantom market.  This primary error led the agency far 
astray from its assigned task, and has unfortunately established a poor prece-
dent for future forbearance petitions.  Fortunately, the Commission can change, 
and has changed, its mind on how it makes forbearance decisions.  Hope 
springs eternal. 
In addition, we discuss the relevance of the Phoenix Forbearance Order for 
the current net neutrality debate and the reclassification of broadband as a Title 
II telecommunications service.  We conclude that the Phoenix Forbearance 
Order—by rejecting the use of forbearance under monopoly and duopolistic 
competition—stands in the way of using forbearance to create a “Title II Lite” 
form of regulation.  In fact, if retail broadband service is classified as a Title II 
service, then for the first time in history the Commission must regulate the re-
tail prices of broadband connections. 
 
 
